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Gustavo Delfino and Guillermo Salas
Abstract. On August 15th, 2004, Venezuelans had the opportunity
to vote in a Presidential Recall Referendum to decide whether or not
President Hugo Cha´vez should be removed from office. The process was
largely computerized using a touch-screen system. In general the ballots
were not manually counted. The significance of the high linear correla-
tion (0.99) between the number of requesting signatures for the recall
petition and the number of opposition votes in computerized centers is
analyzed. The same-day audit was found to be not only ineffective but
a source of suspicion. Official results were compared with the 1998 pres-
idential election and other electoral events and distortions were found.
Key words and phrases: Referendum, election, voting machines, touch
screen, ballot, correlation, uncertainty, audit.
1. INTRODUCTION
A referendum to recall President Hugo Cha´vez
was carried out in Venezuela on August 15, 2004.
The president was not recalled since the official “no”
votes (votes in favor of the president) exceeded the
official “s´ı” votes (votes in favor of removing the
president from his post). The Organization of Amer-
ican States (OAS) and the Carter Center observed
the proceedings and carried out some analyses of the
voting data. They concluded that no tampering was
apparent and that official results were accurate [3].
In this manuscript, we carry out a more in-depth
analysis of both the voting data and the data that
arose from two audits carried out after the recall ref-
erendum. We focus on the association between the
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proportion of voters who had signed a petition to
carry out the referendum and the actual proportion
of “s´ı” votes recorded at each voting center and com-
pare what was observed relative to what might have
been expected under some reasonable assumptions
about voter behavior. We also highlight the differ-
ences between what was observed and what might
have been expected relative to the type of voting
center (manual or computerized) and note that offi-
cial results obtained from computerized voting cen-
ters were surprising.
We conclude that results from our analysis of the
voting and auditing data suggest that official results
may not be as accurate as the OAS/Carter Center
report suggest. The objective of this article is to ar-
gue that a second look at the results of the Presiden-
tial Recall Referendum of 2004 in Venezuela might
be justified.
2. THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
IN VENEZUELA
Electoral events in Venezuela are organized by
the “Consejo Nacional Electoral”1 (CNE). On De-
cember 6, 1998 the current president won the elec-
1Before the new constitution it was known as the “Consejo
Supremo Electoral” (CSE); see http://www.cne.gov.ve.
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tions with 3,673,685 (57.79%) votes versus 2,863,619
(42.21%) votes for his adversaries. The total num-
ber of voters in the electoral registry (REP) at that
time was 11,001,913.
In 1999 a new constitution was enacted which al-
lows citizens to request a recall referendum (RR)
to decide whether the president should continue in
office. This referendum can only be activated after
half of the period for which the president has been
elected has transpired. In order to activate the ref-
erendum, a petition signed by at least 20% of the
voters registered in the REP has to be submitted to
the CNE. It is also possible to request a consultative
nonbinding referendum with the signatures of 10%
of the voters registered in the REP.
On January 3, 2000 a new CNE was appointed but
it failed to organize elections as scheduled. There-
fore, on June 5 of 2000, yet another CNE was ap-
pointed. On July 30, 2000 the president was re-
elected for a 6-year period with 3,757,773 (59.76%)
votes versus 2,530,805 (40.24%) for his adversaries.
The REP had 11,701,521 registered voters at that
time.
In 2002 signatures were collected requesting a con-
sultative referendum which was activated in the mid-
dle of a general national strike. The Supreme Court
disabled the CNE, therefore this consultative ref-
erendum never took place. Citizens then collected
signatures again, this time for a recall referendum.
This was the legal instrument which the government
and the opposition represented by the Coordinadora
Democra´tica agreed to use, with the OAS and the
Carter Center acting as guarantors [1]. This agree-
ment ended the strike.
In 2003, the National Assembly was unable to
agree on a new CNE, so the Supreme Court ap-
pointed a new temporary CNE on August 26, 2003,
even though this procedure was not contemplated
in the constitution. The new CNE rejected the sig-
natures of the petition for a referendum saying that
they had been collected before half of the presiden-
tial period had transpired.
On November 28, 2003 signatures were collected
once again, this time under the supervision of the
CNE. On May 28, 2004, a significant fraction of the
signatures had to be reverified by the CNE. Enough
signatures were valid so, on August 15, 2004 the
Presidential Recall Referendum finally took place.
3. VOTE COLLECTION STRUCTURE
Venezuela is politically organized into states, coun-
ties (municipalities) and townships (parishes). Each
Fig. 1. Venezuelan vote collection structure.
county has one or more voting centers. There can
be several voting tables (voting stations) per center,
and each one has one or more electoral notebooks.
In computerized centers, one voting machine is as-
signed to each electoral notebook. One ballot box is
assigned to each table. Therefore, the ballots from
multiple machines may be combined in a single bal-
lot box. See Figure 1 for the detailed layout of the
system.
Each voting center has a unique identifying code
which makes it possible to compare electoral results
on a center by center basis.
Although the number of manual centers is large,
the number of people registered in those centers is
much smaller than those registered in computerized
centers. These distributions are shown in the his-
tograms of Figure 2.
4. THE VOTING PROCEDURE
There were only two ways to vote2: s´ı (yes) or no.
In order for the president to step down, the number
of s´ı votes had to be greater than 3,757,773 and
greater than the number of no votes.
Touch-screen voting machines were used for the
first time in Venezuela for the Referendum. These
machines also gave the voter a paper ballot to be
deposited in a box. The boxes were never opened
except for some of those selected for auditing. The
results were sent electronically from the voting ma-
chines to the CNE servers using TCP/IP connec-
tions over telephone lines, after which the voting
machines printed out the results, as well as a dupli-
cate set of all the paper ballots in a continuous un-
2In manual voting centers it was also possible to cast a null
vote.
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Fig. 2. Histogram of the size of the manual and the computerized centers.
cut format. The voting centers also had a continuous
satellite TCP/IP connection which was to be used
only by fingerprint machines which were supposed
to prevent anyone from voting twice, even in differ-
ent voting centers.
In order to give the citizens confidence in the re-
sults, two audits were made. The first one was done
on the same day as the Referendum (hot audit). The
second one was carried out three days later (cold au-
dit).
The official results were 3,989,008 (40,64%) s´ı votes
versus 5,800,629 (59,10%) no votes, with 14,037,900
registered voters in the REP. A large fraction of the
votes (87.1%) were cast at computerized voting cen-
ters.
The whole electoral process and the audits were
supervised and endorsed by the OAS and the Carter
Center. They found no evidence of alterations or
tampering in the results in their final report.
5. THE SIGNATURES
5.1 Introduction
In order to activate the Referendum, on November
28, 2003, signatures and fingerprints were collected
in a four-day event organized by the CNE, with wit-
nesses from all political parties. Special forms, with
serial numbers were supplied by the CNE to all po-
litical parties. There were 2,676 signature collection
centers (SCCs), all of them in Venezuela. No signa-
ture collection was allowed outside Venezuela.
There were two kinds of forms: types A and B.
Type A forms were used in the SCCs. Type B forms
were also assigned to SCCs, but they were meant to
be used for house to house signature-collecting (un-
der pro-government witness supervision). There were
618,800 type A forms and 98,286 type B forms. Each
form had a maximum capacity of 10 signatures.
The number of signatures required to activate the
Referendum was 20% of the REP used to elect the
president, that is, 0.2× 11,701,521 = 2,340,305 sig-
natures. The law required the publication in a news-
paper of a list of ID numbers of all the people who
signed the petition.
The CNE divided the signatures into three cat-
egories: valid, invalid and questionable. An impor-
tant number of questionable signatures had to be
collected again in order to reach the required mini-
mum number of signatures.
Opposition groups claimed to have submitted
3,467,051 signatures to the CNE. Within the CNE,
19,842 signatures were lost.3 An additional indeter-
minate number of signatures were lost before reach-
ing the CNE.
It is reasonable to assume that most of those who
signed requesting the Referendum intended to vote
s´ı in favor of the recall.4 However, it is also possible
that some signers voted no. This might have been
the case for government supporters who signed the
petition because they believed they could use the
referendum to help solve the high level of political
confrontation in the country. There were also signers
who changed their political preferences between the
time of the signature collection and the vote.
In the following sections, the official results of
the referendum will be compared with the signa-
tures collected. This will reveal some important facts
about these results.
5.2 Si Vote Uncertainty With Regard to
Signatures
Let k be the relative number of s´ı votes, as defined
in equation (1):
k =
s´ı votes
signatures
.(1)
Also, let s be the relative number of signatures in
a voting center, as defined in equation (2):
s=
signatures
s´ı votes + no votes + null votes
(2)
=
signatures
total votes
.
3See http://buscador.eluniversal.com/2004/05/09/apo
art 09152D.shtml
4The OAS and the Carter Certer concur with this state-
ment. See [2], Section 5, second paragraph.
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Fig. 3. Relationship between k and s for computerized and manual centers. The shadowed area contains the mathematically
impossible values of k. The maximum k value is 1/s. The hollow dots represent voting centers located in consular offices.
For each value of s, there is a maximum possible k
which is just 1/s as shown in equation (3):
kmax =
max(s´ı votes)
signatures
=
total votes
signatures
(3)
=
total votes
s · total votes
=
1
s
.
In voting centers with a large value of s, we ex-
pected a value of k around 1. This is because each
signature has a high probability of resulting in a s´ı
vote, and at the same time kmax gets close to 1.
For example, in a voting center with 1,000 total
votes and 900 signatures, the number of expected s´ı
votes is between 900 and 1,000. Here s= 900/1,000 =
0.9 and kmax = 1/0.9 = 1.11¯. Therefore, the uncer-
tainty in the value of k is very small, as it should be
between5 1 and 1.11¯.
The situation is completely different in voting cen-
ters with a small value of s. Notice that there is an
essential singularity in k at s= 0 as shown in equa-
tion (4):
k =
s´ı votes/total votes
s
.(4)
This singularity can produce very high values of k
in the neighborhood of s = 0. Hence, the level of
uncertainty in k becomes very large.
For example, in a voting center with 1,000 total
votes and 2 signatures, the number of expected s´ı
votes is between 2 and 1,000. Here s = 2/1,000 =
5The value of k could be lower than 1 if, for any reason,
the number of votes was low (e.g., high abstention).
0.002 and kmax = 1/0.002 = 500. Therefore, the un-
certainty in the value of k is extremely large, as it
should be between 1 and 500.
The reasons for the uncertainty in k just discussed
are purely mathematical. In practical terms, high
values of k in centers with a small s were due to the
following facts:
• There were only 2,676 SCCs compared to 8,394
voting centers. Therefore, voters living far from
a SCC could not sign the petition, even if they
wanted to. This was the case in mostly rural areas.
• There were many people who did not sign the pe-
tition because of their fear of retribution from the
government. On the other hand, voting was secret.
• There were s´ı votes from people who could not
sign because they were not in the REP or were
outside the country at the time of signature col-
lection.
• Some SCCs ran out of forms. Not everyone was
able to go to a more distant SCC to sign.
• An undetermined number of signatures were lost.
• There were s´ı votes from people who just didn’t
bother to sign the petition.
Notice that all these issues with the signatures did
not affect all voting centers equally. Centers with
a small value of s are more likely to have been af-
fected by these issues than centers with a high value
of s.
A plot of k versus s is shown in Figure 3. No-
tice that when s is not large, all the computerized
centers are very far away from kmax, clearly contra-
dicting the expected nonlinear behavior with respect
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Fig. 4. Relationship between k and total number of votes for computerized and manual centers in the same size range. The
hollow dots represent voting centers located in consular offices.
to s. On the other hand, the manual center results
are effectively distributed in the allowed range re-
gardless of the relative number of signatures.
In summary:
It is expected that k’s from voting centers
with a small value of s will be much more
variable than those with large values of s.
5.2.1 Behavior of k with regard to the size and cha-
racteristics of the voting centers. Although the man-
ual centers tend to have fewer voters than the com-
puterized centers, this does not seem to be the only
reason for the different behavior in k. This can be
seen in Figure 4.
There were many small computerized voting cen-
ters in rural areas. Many used mobile phone lines to
connect the voting machines to the CNE servers to
transmit the results because of the lack of regular
phone lines in these remote areas.
There were 586 townships which included both
manual and computerized voting centers. These
mixed townships had 5,449 voting centers (2,538
manuals and 2,911 computerized). Notice in Fig-
ure 5 (top) that the behavior of k in these mixed
townships, is very different for manual and com-
Fig. 5. Relationship between k and s for computerized (right) and manual centers (left) for mixed townships (top) and
hamlets (bottom).
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Fig. 6. Manual centers have a correlation of 0.607 with respect to the signatures while computerized centers have a correlation
of 0.989. A correlation of 1 would look like a straight line.
puterized centers. Appendix B shows an example
of such a mixed township.
Another interesting comparison is related to ham-
lets (“caser´ıos”). A total of 2,162 voting centers in
hamlets were identified6 (1,852 manual and 310 com-
puterized).
Due to the reasons mentioned in Section 5.2, many
hamlets must have been far away from a SCC. For
this reason voting centers located in hamlets should
include large values of k. In Figure 5 (bottom) it
can be seen that these large values are found only
in manual voting centers.
Furthermore, Figure 5 shows that the behavior of
the k values in computerized voting centers in ham-
lets looks more like that of the rest of the computer-
ized centers than the behavior of the 1,852 manual
centers located in the rest of the hamlets.
5.3 Correlations Between Si Votes and
Requesting Signatures
Let rs´ı be the correlation of s´ı votes with respect
to the number of signatures.
The Carter Center and the OAS said the following
in one of their reports [2]:
A very high correlation between the num-
ber of signers and the number of s´ı votes
6The official list of voting centers was searched for the word
“CASERIO” in the address field. These produced the list of
2,162 voting centers.
per center in the universe of automated
voting machines has been found—a cor-
relation coefficient of 0.988. This means
that in voting centers where a high signer
turnout was obtained, a high s´ı vote also
was obtained.7
What this report does not mention is that for
manual voting centers, the correlation is 0.607,
a much lower value. This difference can be visual-
ized in Figure 6. Notice that a straight line from
the origin to each of the points has a slope of k.
The high correlation value for computerized centers
translates into similar k values (or slopes) for most
centers.
In this case, the high correlation in computerized
voting centers also implies that in voting centers
where a low signer turnout was obtained, a low s´ı
vote was also obtained. This can be seen in the ori-
gin of Figure 6(b). Hence, when the number of sig-
natures tends to zero, the number of s´ı votes also
tends to zero. But, as observed in Figure 6(a), man-
ual centers do not exhibit the same behavior.
The behavior found in computerized centers seems
unexpected because the relationship between signa-
tures and s´ı votes should not be linear, especially
when the number of signatures is small. As explained
in Section 5.2, you could expect a large number
7This correlation value was reproduced with a difference of
just 0.001 which is negligible.
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Table 1
Correlations of s´ı votes with respect to the relative
number of signatures s per center, for manual and
computerized voting centers
s ≤ 0.5 s > 0.5 All
rs´ı # rs´ı # rs´ı #
Manual 0.613 3,375 0.947 221 0.607 3,596
Computerized 0.983 3,943 0.994 645 0.989 4,588
Both 0.953 7,318 0.996 866 0.973 8,184
of s´ı votes if there were a large number of signa-
tures, but as the number of signatures per center
decreases, the level of uncertainty in the number of
s´ı votes with respect to the number of signatures
increases.
In Table 1 the correlations are calculated for cen-
ters where signers were a minority (s ≤ 0.5) and
a majority (s > 0.5). Notice that as expected, the
correlation for manual centers is much higher when
there are many signatures (0.947) than when there
are fewer signatures (0.613). This is the expected
behavior because when you have many signatures
the uncertainty of k is small, and the number of
s´ı votes is equal to k × signatures so the uncer-
tainty in the absolute number of s´ı votes is also
small.
In the case of the 645 computerized voting centers
where s > 0.5 the correlation was 0.994 which is very
high. It stands out that in the computerized voting
centers where signers were a minority, the correla-
tion is still very high at 0.983. Furthermore, there is
not a single computerized voting center with many
more s´ı votes than signatures as seen in Figure 6(b).
In other words, for some reason, computerized cen-
ters do not seem to show the expected nonlinear
relationship between signatures and s´ı votes.
5.4 Correlation Plot
In order to further investigate the change of un-
certainty as the relative number of signatures varies,
a technique similar to a moving average is used.
The difference is that instead of calculating an aver-
age, a correlation is calculated. A window size of 150
voting centers was used. This is the same number of
centers that were audited.
In order to do this, the first step is to sort the
voting centers, computerized and manual, according
to their s value. Then rs´ı is calculated for centers in
positions 1 to 150. Subsequently rs´ı is calculated for
centers in positions 2 to 151, and so on. The result
is shown in Figure 7.
For manual centers, there are large variations in
the correlation in the left side of Figure 7. This
is the result of outliers coming in and out of the
150 centers calculation window. As the outliers are
real official data, they should not be dropped. In-
stead, logarithms can be used for both the num-
ber of votes and signatures. This way the effect of
the outlier is taken into account in a better way.
The result of using this technique is shown in Fig-
ure 8.
Regardless of whether correlations are calculated
on a linear scale (Figure 7) or on a logarithmic scale
(Figure 8), the important fact to point out is that
the reduction in correlation as s decreases is large
for manual centers, whereas it is negligible for com-
puterized centers.
6. THE HYPOTHESIS
What has been presented thus far should be enough
to cast a serious shadow of doubt regarding the of-
ficial results in the computerized centers. Based on
Fig. 7. Correlations plot using a window of 150 voting centers.
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Fig. 8. Correlations plot (logarithmic scale) using a 150 voting centers window.
this, it is natural to consider the following hypothe-
sis8:
Hypothesis. In computerized centers, official
results were forced to follow a linear relationship
with respect to the number of signatures.
If this hypothesis were true, because of the rea-
sons explained in Section 5.2, the results would be
distorted with respect to reality, especially in voting
centers with a small s value.
In places where the signatures did not correctly
capture the political intention of the people, two
things would happen:
1. The number of s´ı votes, according to the official
CNE results, would tend to be much lower than
the number of real s´ı votes.
2. The official results of those computerized voting
centers would be a poor representation of the po-
litical intentions in the area.
In the next section the results of the referendum
will be compared to those of the 1998 presidential
election in order to find out if these distortions are
indeed present.
7. 1998 ELECTION COMPARISON
Despite the fact that more than 5 years separate
the 1998 presidential election and the Referendum,
and that the Referendum was not an election, there
are reasons that make the comparison of both events
interesting:
8The mechanics of how votes could have been altered, and
by whom is not studied here. However, the fact that the ma-
chines established a TCP/IP connection to the CNE, discon-
nected and only then printed the results, opens many security
holes. These issues are beyond the scope of this article.
• In both cases the future of the presidency was at
stake.
• In Venezuela, since 1958 a new president had been
elected every 5 years. Immediate reelection was
prohibited by the 1961 constitution. Between the
1998 election and the 2004 Referendum, 5 years
and 8 months had gone by. On the other hand, the
president had repeatedly claimed that he would
stay in office at least until the year 2021.
• Both events were open for all Venezuelan citizens
in the electoral registry.
• Both cases involved a very polarized electorate. In
1998 the top two candidates obtained 96.17% of
the valid votes. The other 3.83% of the votes went
to candidates who were also politically opposed to
the winning candidate.
• There were 8,431 voting centers in 1998 and 8,394
voting centers for the Referendum. The events
had 8,328 voting centers in common.
• Comparing the 1998 election and the Referendum
results gives an estimate of whether the popular-
ity of the president increased or decreased in the
vicinity of each voting center.
Additionally, the 1998 electoral results are used
for comparison because at that time, the CNE was
not under the influence of the current government.
7.1 Correlations Between % of Opposition
Votes in 1998 and in RR
By comparing the electoral results (percentage of
opposition) on a township by township basis, it was
detected that some of them had a high correlation
with respect to previous results while others had
a very low correlation. The townships with higher
opposition results with respect to 1998 tend to have
a higher correlation than the others. This correla-
tion will be called r1998, and the percentage of op-
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Fig. 9. Two sample townships. All the centers shown are computerized voting centers.
position difference will be called ∆%RR
1998
as defined
in equation (5):
∆%RR1998 = (% Opposition in RR)
(5)
− (% Opposition in 1998).
In order to illustrate this, the results of two town-
ships are plotted in Figure 9. In the “Olegario Vil-
lalobos” township, the correlation with respect to
the signatures and the 1998 percentage of opposition
is large at rs´ı = 0.988 and r1998 = 0.984 respectively.
Additionally, notice that the average s is 0.639, so
signers were the majority in this township. There-
fore, the signatures are likely to have captured the
political intentions of voters here.
In the case of the “Vista al Sol” township, the
average s is very low. Therefore, the uncertainty in
the number of s´ı votes with respect to the signatures
could be large, as was shown in Section 5.2. In other
words, the signatures are not likely to have captured
the political intentions of the township accurately.
This uncertainty is just not seen in the official re-
sults, as the correlation of s´ı votes with respect to
the signatures is 0.990. Furthermore, the referendum
results seem very distorted with respect to the 1998
election, with a negative correlation of −0.667. In
this township, the center with the most opposition
in 1998 ended up being the most pro-government,
and vice versa.9
The two townships shown in Figure 9 behave con-
sistently with the hypothesis. “Olegario Villalobos”
was able to increase its percentage of opposition be-
cause many signatures were collected, whereas “Vis-
ta al Sol” could not increase its percentage of oppo-
sition because only a few signatures were collected.
If this repeats itself in the rest of the country, then
r1998 would be large when ∆%
RR
1998
is large, and r1998
would be small when ∆%RR
1998
is small. In an un-
touched process, these two variables should be inde-
pendent.
In Figure 10, it is shown that, indeed in all of
the country there is a strong relationship between
∆%RR
1998
and r1998 for computerized centers at the
township, county and state levels. This relationship
is much weaker—almost inexistant—for manual vot-
ing centers. This finding is consistent with the hy-
pothesis.
9This center returned to being the one with the most op-
position 77 days later in the state governors election.
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Fig. 10. Relationship between r1998 and ∆%
RR
1998 at the state, county and township levels for manual and computerized voting
centers. The correlation between ∆%RR1998 and r1998 is shown as r⋆. Assuming that ∆%
RR
1998 and r1998 are independent, the
probability of seeing those r⋆ values is calculated in Appendix D.
8. VARIABILITY IN VALUES OF k AND THE
CORRELATION BETWEEN PERCENTAGE OF
OPPOSITION AND VALUES OF s, FOR
VARIOUS ELECTORAL EVENTS
In Section 5.2, it was stated that as the value of s
decreases, the variability in k is expected to increase.
According to equation (4) this variability must also
be present in the relation between s and the percent-
age of opposition. Therefore, as s becomes small, it
should correlate poorly with the percentage of op-
position. For this reason, when s is small, it should
not determine the percentage of opposition. On the
other hand, when s becomes large, it should corre-
late better with the percentage of opposition.
Let rs be the correlation of the percentage of op-
position and s, and let s˜ be the median of all the
values of s for computerized centers. For the subset
of computerized centers with s ≤ s˜ this correlation
will be called rs,s≤s˜, and for the remaining centers
where s > s˜ the correlation will be called rs,s>s˜.
The value of rs,s≤s˜ should be smaller than rs,s>s˜.
These properties just defined are calculated for var-
ious electoral events in Table 2.
The exit poll shown in Table 2 was made under the
supervision of Penn, Schoen and Berland Associates.
The State Governors election took place just
77 days after the Referendum. By counting votes for
and against the pro-government candidate, a per-
centage of opposition was calculated. During this
election, the same voting machines were used, but
there was an important difference: the paper ballots
were manually counted for a randomly selected vot-
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Table 2
Correlation rs for computerized centers with s above and below s˜, for different electoral events
Date Event rs,s≤s˜ rs,s>s˜ rs,s>s˜ − rs,s≤s˜
Dec 6, 1998 Presidential election 0.439 0.685 0.246
Jul 30, 2000 Presidential election 0.607 0.802 0.195
Aug 15, 2004 Referendum official results 0.845 0.830 −0.015
Aug 15, 2004 Exit polls 0.325 0.739 0.414
Oct 31, 2004 States Governors election 0.475 0.707 0.232
ing machine in each and every voting center. The re-
sults for the correlation rs for this election are shown
in Table 2.
From Table 2 it is clear that only the Referendum
official results fail to exhibit a positive correlation
difference. Also notice in Figure 11 that for the Ref-
erendum official results, there is not a single voting
center with a small s and large percentage of oppo-
sition. The fact that only in the official Referendum
results rs,s≤s˜ is not smaller than rs,s>s˜ is consistent
with the hypothesis.
9. HOT AUDIT
In general, the paper ballots from the computer-
ized centers were not manually counted. The CNE
assured the Venezuelan citizens that the voting ma-
chines had to accurately reflect the voters intention,
because a sample of 192 machines (1% of them)
would be randomly selected and audited the same
day of the referendum. This is indeed a valid way
of eliminating suspicion, as long as the selection is
a truly random sample of all the voting machines.
The day of the referendum, the CNE informed the
public that because of logistical reasons, the sam-
ple would be taken from a restricted universe of 20
counties located in urban areas, leaving out of the
audit more than 300 counties. With this decision,
confidence in the results was adversely affected to
say the least.
The computerized voting centers inside and out-
side of the 20 counties, to which the hot-audit uni-
verse was reduced, are shown in Figure 12. It is clear
that these 20 counties are not representative of all
the computerized voting centers. See Appendix E
for further details on this subject.
Furthermore, out of 192 centers selected for hot
audit, only 26 were actually audited in the pres-
ence of witnesses representing the opposition and
the international observers. The following excerpt
from the Carter Center Comprehensive Report [4]
is very illustrative:
Auditors, table members, and military per-
sonnel were not properly informed that
the audit would occur nor were they clear
about the procedure to be followed. The
instructions themselves did not clearly call
for a separate tally of the Yes and No
votes, and in some centers, the auditors
only counted the total number of voters.
(. . . )
Nevertheless, Carter Center observers were
able to witness six auditing processes. In
only one of the six auditing sites observed
by The Carter Center did the paper bal-
lot receipt counting actually occur. In this
place, the auditing was conducted by the
mesa president, and the recount of the
ballots produced exactly the same result
as the acta printed by the voting machine.
In the rest of the sites observed, the audi-
tor appointed by the CNE did not allow
the opening of the ballot box, explaining
his/her instructions did not include the
counting of the Yes and No ballots from
multiple machines.
There were also complaints of military deny-
ing access to voting centers where audits
were being conducted. Carter Center ob-
servers could not confirm this claim. (. . . )
The CNE provided The Carter Center with
copies of the audit reports of 25 centers.
It was clear from the forms that the au-
dit was not carried out in many places
because the fields in the form were left
empty, there were no signatures of pro-
government or opposition witnesses, etc.
The forms were poorly filled out, clearly
showing inadequate training. The instruc-
tions issued by the CNE to the auditors
were either incomplete or unclear. This is
a direct consequence of issuing the audit
regulation three days before the election.
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Fig. 11. Correlation between percentage of opposition and s for the lower two (s ≤ s˜) and upper two quartiles (s > s˜) for
computerized centers. The correlation for the lower two quartiles is expected to be smaller than the correlation in the upper
two quartiles. This expected difference is not seen in the Referendum official results.
The final result was that the CNE squan-
dered a crucial opportunity to build con-
fidence and trust in the electoral system
and outcome of the recall referendum.
Auditing only 26 centers out of 192 selected cen-
ters, is basically a cancellation of the auditing pro-
cess. But, is there anything special about these 26
centers? If this drastic reduction in audit size was
because it was “poorly executed,” and poor execu-
tion is independent of the value of s, then the value
of s of these 26 centers would behave as a random
sample within the s value of the 192 selected cen-
ters.
From Figure 13, it is clear that the 26 centers that
were actually audited seem to have a much higher
value of s than the 192 centers from where they
come from. The average s for the 192 selected cen-
ters is s¯selected = 0.372 while for the audited ones it is
s¯audited = 0.540. Additionally, the distribution of the
192 selected centers is positively skewed while the
distribution of the 26 audited centers is negatively
skewed.
Can this be just a coincidence? A Monte Carlo sim-
ulation was done, selecting 26 random centers out of
the 192 selected for auditing. The result of this sim-
ulation is that the probability of having a s¯audited =
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Fig. 12. Centers inside (a) and outside (b) of the 20 counties to where the hot-audit drawing was restricted.
0.540 is 1 in 50 million; and this does not take into
account the difference in skewness.
This result is consistent with the hypothesis, be-
cause centers with a small value of s are the ones
most susceptible to distortions.
Thus, it has been shown that the audited cen-
ters are not representative of neither the universe of
all computerized centers, nor the restricted universe
used to select them.
The audited centers are not representative of the
universe of computerized voting centers (see Fig-
ure 14) because:
1. In the audited centers, the s´ı vote won by 63.47%
to 40.91%.
Fig. 13. Comparison between the s value of the 192 selected centers and the 26 audited centers. TOP: The selected centers
are ordered according to the value of s and plotted. BOTTOM: Back-to-back stem-and-leaf plot showing the same values of s
as in the top figure. To obtain s values, multiply stem by 0.1 and leaves by 0.01.
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Fig. 14. In this figure, the 26 computerized audited centers are compared with the universe of computerized centers. The
average s and ∆%RR1998 are indicated with lines.
2. ∆%RR
1998
is very different.
3. The value of s is much larger.
Additionally, the townships, counties and states
where centers were audited are not representative
of the other townships, counties and states. They
are not representative with regard to their ∆%RR
1998
and the correlation with respect to the 1998 election
r1998. This can be seen in Figure 15.
10. COLD AUDIT
Given the fact that the hot audit failed to serve
its purpose, another audit was made three (3) days
after the referendum. This audit cannot validate the
official results mainly because of two reasons:
• The audited entity itself cannot select the centers
to be audited. According to the OAS/Carter re-
port [3] “The sample was generated by CNE staff”
on its own computer using its own software.
• The control mechanisms that had been implemen-
ted to certify that the samples were unaltered
were not used.
The draw to select the centers to be audited was
broadcast live on the official television station, but
the results were not shown. Usually, the whole idea
of transmitting a draw on TV, is to let the public
know the results as they are being generated.
When the ballot boxes were closed and sealed, and
the electoral centers closed, the seal was signed by
witnesses. The boxes were then taken into custody
of the military.
The following excerpt from the OAS/Carter Cen-
ter report [3] explains the mechanism used to certify
that the boxes were unaltered:
Each box was physically checked to see
whether:
1. The material used to seal the box was
intact or whether there were signs that
it had been taken off and then replaced.
2. There were cracks or holes through
which votes might have been extracted
or inserted.
If a box was defective in regard to seal-
ing, cracks, or holes, all the boxes of that
polling station were excluded from the au-
dit and a note to that effect recorded in
the minutes.
However, the witnesses who had signed the boxes
were not called to certify the authenticity of the box.
When this audit was questioned, the Carter Cen-
ter and OAS response was that:
Furthermore, the correlation between the
signers and the s´ı votes is almost identical
in the universe and in the sample. The
difference between the correlations is less
than 1 percent:
Correlation coefficient
Universe 0.988
Sample 0.989
This certainly can be used to argue that the boxes
opened were representative of the official results, but
does not indicate anything in regard to validating
the official results.
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Fig. 15. Townships, counties and states where the 26 audited centers are located. The vertical axis is the correlation with
respect to the percentage of opposition in 1998 (r1998). The horizontal axis is the difference in percentage of opposition with
respect to 1998 (∆%RR1998).
Interestingly, the draws for the hot and cold audit
included 16 common centers. These 16 centers were
successfully cold-audited, but none of them were al-
lowed to be hot-audited.
11. CONCLUSIONS
We have explored the voting data arising from the
RR carried out in 2004 and also the results of two
audits conducted after the RR took place. We have
identified several issues associated with the results
obtained from voting centers using touch-screen vot-
ing machines. In particular:
1. The official s´ı results in computerized centers seem
to behave in an excessively linear fashion relative
to the number of signatures in support of the RR
in each voting center (see Section 5).
16 G. DELFINO AND G. SALAS
2. The official s´ı results in computerized centers are
surprising given the results of the 1998 elections
in those same centers (see Section 7).
3. The percentage of votes for the opposition seem
to be too highly correlated with s, the relative num-
ber of signatures in a voting center, in particular
in those centers where s was small (see Section 8).
When combined with the facts that in general,
paper ballots were not counted and that voting ma-
chines were connected to a central CNE server before
voting results could be printed, these observations
suggest that the official results obtained from com-
puterized voting centers deserve a closer look.
In principle, two audits—a hot audit carried out
immediately following the referendum and a cold au-
dit carried out three days later—should have helped
resolve any questions arising about the voting and
vote counting processes. However, an analysis of the
data that resulted from the two audits reveals that
the audits were not conducted as had originally been
announced and thus could not alleviate doubts about
the official results nor could they be used to certify
the accuracy of results. In particular, we argue that:
1. The computerized centers in the 20 counties to
which the hot audit was restricted by the CNE
were not representative of the universe of com-
puterized voting centers (Figure 12).
2. The hot-audited centers were not representative
of the rest of the computerized centers (Figure 14).
3. Townships, counties and states where computer-
ized centers were hot-audited were not a repre-
sentative sample of townships, counties and states
in Venezuela (Figure 15).
4. The probability that the centers that were hot-
audited do not appear to be a random sample of
all computerized voting centers seems to be high
and thus it is difficult to believe that the unexpect-
ed sample of audited centers was due to chance
alone. Note that centers that were actually au-
dited were drawn from a subsample of all centers
with a high proportion of signatures (Figure 13).
5. Audits were suspended in centers with low s,
where the linearity in the official results is most
questionable.
While none of this constitutes proof of tampering,
we believe that our analyses of some of the data
collected in association with the recall referendum
cast some doubt about the accuracy of the official
results. If in fact it is reasonable to assume that:
• A person who signed the form requesting a refer-
endum was likely to vote s´ı.
• A person who did not sign the form is not neces-
sarily likely to vote no, then the very high corre-
lation between the proportion of signers and the
proportion of s´ı votes at a center should be viewed
with suspicion rather than as a confirmation that
official results are believable, as the OAS/Carter
Center report claim. Indeed, an excerpt from the
report states that:
“There is a high correlation between the
number of YES votes per voting center
and the number of signers of the presi-
dential recall request per voting center ;
the places where more signatures were
collected also are the places where more
YES votes were cast. There is no anoma-
ly in the characteristics of the YES votes
when compared to the presumed inten-
tion of the signers to recall the president.”
We argue exactly the opposite and have provided
persuasive arguments to support our position.
APPENDIX A: DATA PROCESSING
METHODOLOGY
Official Referendum results were downloaded
from the CNE website: http://www.cne.gob.ve/
referendum presidencial2004/.
The download was automated using a custom-made
Perl script. All the data was stored on a MySQL data-
base. Calculations were made usingMathematica 5.2
which was connected to MySQL using the Database-
Link package. Electoral results from the 1998 pres-
idential election were obtained on an original CNE
CD-ROM, and the data was converted from Mi-
crosoft Access to MySQL. The REP from July 2004
was also converted from MS Access to MySQL. The
CNE signature data was obtained on a CD from
Su´mate, and is the same version given to the OAS
and the Carter Center. This data was supplied in
a single text file.
By matching people’s identification numbers (ce´-
dula number) from the signatures and REP data,
it was possible to find the number of signatures per
voting center.
In order to classify voting centers into manual and
computerized, the following sources of information
were used:
• Su´mate’s list of computerized and manual voting
centers.
• On the CNE website, computerized centers show
results down to the voting machine level, whereas
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Fig. 16. Partial aerial view of Miguel Pen˜a township (taken from the Google EarthTM mapping service). Manual versus
computerized voting centers are compared in regards to their k value and total number of votes (TV). The image is centered
at Latitude 10◦7′32.66′′N and Longitude 68◦1′22.48′′W.
manual voting centers show results down to the
voting table level.
The list of computerized and manual centers ob-
tained using the aforementioned sources was com-
pared on a township by township basis with the
CNE infrastructure document [5].
The list of centers effectively audited on the day
of the Referendum was obtained from a document
given by the Coordinadora Democra´tica to the Carter
Center and OAS. A copy of this document and the
data needed to reproduce this study can be found
at: http://esdata.info/2004.
The coordinates of the voting centers shown in
Appendix B were provided by “Delta Electoral.”
The simulation was done using a deck of cards
shuffling algorithm. The random number generator
used by this algorithm was the “Wolfram rule 30
cellular automaton generator for integers,” which is
provided by Mathematica.
APPENDIX B: A MIXED TOWNSHIP
EXAMPLE
Miguel Pen˜a is a township in Valencia County, in
the state of Carabobo. It is one of the townships
with higher population in the country. It had 32
voting centers, 28 computerized and 4 manual.
In Figure 16, a partial aerial view of this township
is shown. In it, notice that manual and computerized
voting centers are in the same urban neighborhood.
Despite this, the values of k are much higher for the
manual centers than for the surrounding computer-
ized centers, regardless of the total number of votes.
In Figure 17 notice that in this township, the low-
est k value of the 4 manual centers is greater than
the maximum k value of the 28 computerized voting
centers.
APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL NONLINEARITY
PLOTS
According to the exit polls made under the su-
pervision of Penn, Schoen and Berland Associates,
the opposition won the Referendum by a wide mar-
gin. By changing the numerator of equation (4) from
percentage of s´ı votes to percentage of s´ı from exit
polls, a value of kexit polls can be calculated. The
result, for computerized centers only, is plotted on
Figure 18.
Similarly, k1998 can be calculated by using the per-
centage of opposition in the 1998 presidential elec-
tion in the numerator of equation (4). The result, for
computerized centers only, is shown on Figure 19.
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Fig. 17. Behavior of k versus total votes in all of Miguel Pen˜a’s voting centers. Manual and computerized centers are shown.
APPENDIX D: MONTE CARLO
SIMULATIONS FOR CORRELATION
BETWEEN ∆%RR
1998
AND r1998.
Assuming that ∆%RR
1998
and r1998 are independent,
regardless of being calculated at state, county or
township level, then the correlation between them r⋆
must be casual. In order to find the probability that
the observed r⋆ is casual, it is possible to reorder
the values of r1998 with respect to ∆%
RR
1998
. This re-
ordering was made 100,000 times and the correlation
was calculated each time. In all cases, the resulting
distribution was found to be normal. The estimated
probabilities for manual and computerized centers
at state, county or township level are shown in Fig-
ure 20.
APPENDIX E: DIFFERENCES IN
CHARACTERISTICS, OFFICIAL RESULTS
AND REP VARIATION OF THE 20 COUNTIES
SUBJECT TO HOT-AUDIT DRAWING IN
COMPARISON TO THE OTHER COUNTIES
When the CNE decided to restrict the audit to 20
urban counties, it created two groups of computer-
ized centers:
• 2,040 computerized centers inside the 20 counties
and therefore subject to be selected in the draw.
Variables referring to these centers will use a 20
as a subindex (•20).
• 2,553 computerized centers not subject to hot au-
dit at all. Variables referring to these centers will
use a ∅ as a subindex (•∅).
Fig. 18. Exit polls at computerized centers.
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Fig. 19. 1998 presidential election at computerized centers.
Fig. 20. Comparison of official results correlation r⋆ versus expected value distribution found after 100,000 simulations for
manual and computerized centers at state, county or township level. The simulation results follow a normal distribution, which
is shown as a dotted line. The probability of the official r⋆ happening by chance is indicated as p.
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Fig. 21. Comparison of s probability density function (pdf) and cumulative density function (cmf) for computerized centers
inside the 20 counties of the hot audit and in the 302 excluded counties.
In Figure 12 it is shown that the behavior in com-
puterized centers in the 20 counties is very different
from that of the rest of the country.
E.1 Differences in Characteristics
When the CNE set up the signature collection
event, it established the number of signature col-
lection centers (SCC) directly in proportion to the
number of people in the electoral registry (REP)
for each county. A lot of people live in urban coun-
ties, therefore, a lot of SCCs were assigned to these
counties. Thus, access from where the people lived
to where they had to sign was much easier in these
20 counties. On the other hand, voting centers are
more numerous and better distributed throughout
the national territory.
For example, a county like Chacao in the Mi-
randa state has 27 km2 of area and 11 SCCs. In
Chacao there were 24 voting centers, all of them
computerized. On the other hand, the much larger
Macanao Pen´ınsula in Margarita Island has an area
of 330.7 km2 and only had 3 SCCs. There were 8
voting centers in Macanao, all of them computer-
ized.
In Figure 21, it can clearly be seen that the 20
counties have higher s values which is consistent
with the ideas just explained.
There were many computerized centers in rural
areas where it was much more difficult to sign than
to vote. When the audit universe was restricted to
20 urban counties, all computerized centers in rural
areas, the ones with a higher uncertainty in k, were
excluded from the hot-audit drawing universe.
E.2 Differences in Results
When the value of s decreases, in general, it is
expected that the k values should increase, after
all, kmax = 1/s. Hence, a larger k is expected in
rural counties than in the 20 counties of the hot
audit where signing was less troublesome. However,
in the official results, exactly the opposite occurred,
as shown in Figure 22.
Considering that for the official referendum re-
sults k¯20 is the average of 2,040 voting centers and k¯∅
is the average of the remaining 2,553 voting cen-
ters, how likely is it that just by chance, k¯20 be
larger than k¯∅ by 3.4%? What could be expected
is that k¯20 would be smaller than k¯∅. Contrary to
official results, in the exit polls and in the 1998 elec-
tion k¯20 is significantly less than k¯∅, as shown in
Figure 22.
As seen in Figure 23, the distribution of k val-
ues among the 2,040 auditable centers is quite dif-
ferent from that of the 2,553 nonauditable centers.
The k values in the 2,040 auditable centers tend to
be larger than in the other 2,553 nonauditable cen-
ters. The portion of centers with k smaller or near
to 1, is much smaller in the 2,040 auditable centers
than in the other 2,553. That is contrary to what
happened in the 1998 election and in the exit poll.
Additionally, note that the k pdf seems to be much
more symmetric than that in the 1998 results or the
exit polls.
How likely is it that k20 cmf be below k∅ cmf
with such a large difference (D = 0.233)? Being con-
servative and assuming that both k20 and k∅ distri-
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Fig. 22. Comparison of average k and s values for the computerized centers inside and outside the 20 counties to which the
hot-audit universe was restricted. These k¯ and s¯ values are shown for the official referendum results, for the 1998 presidential
election and for the referendum exit polls.
Fig. 23. Comparison of k probability density function (pdf) and cumulative density function (cmf) for computerized centers
inside the 20 counties of the hot audit and in the 302 excluded counties. The maximum cmf difference (Supremum) for the
official results is shown as D.
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Fig. 24. REP variation versus ∆%RR1998 in computerized centers inside and outside the 20 counties of the hot-audit drawing.
A least-square line is included in both cases.
butions came from the same continuous distribution,
the probability can be estimated using the Kolmogo-
rov–Smirnov Test for two samples. This probabil-
ity was found to be in the order of 2.6 × 10−54.
For the reasons previously exposed, the distribu-
tion of k∅ should be greater—not equal—than that
of k20. Hence, the actual probability should be much
smaller.
E.3 Electoral Registry (REP) Differences
Between April and July 2004, 1,842,959 (14.9%)
voters were added to the REP. In the computerized
centers the number of registered voters went from
10,849,321 to 12,390,159. In Figure 24 it is shown
how differently these increments were distributed
in the computerized centers. Furthermore, in Fig-
ure 25, it can be seen that the 192 centers selected
Fig. 25. REP variation versus ∆%RR1998 in all computerized centers indicating the 192 selected for hot-auditing. None of the
192 selected centers were in the rectangle area.
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to be hot audited exclude an area where the govern-
ment has important gains without a big increase in
the REP.
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